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Using a unique enterprise-level data set, which covers the regions Moscow City,
Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk and Chuvashia and the three sectors manufacturing and
mining, construction and trade and distribution, we estimate Russian labour demand
equations for the year 1997. The most important conclusion that can be drawn is that
labour demand is  inelastic in international perspective if we estimate a labour demand
equation for all regions and all sectors combined. So, Russian MLEs well into the
transition still exhibit peculiar behaviour as far as wage employment trade-offs are
concerned.  We try to relate this inelastic labour demand to basic neoclassical theory by
testing Marshall’s rules of derived demand. Our results show that testing these rules
seems a promising avenue for establishing some of the driving forces, which are behind
labour demand in Russia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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I. Introduction
The transition process to a market economy has been extremely difficult in the
Russian Federation. Figure 1 shows a collapse of GDP of almost 50% in less than 10
years, with no signs of recovery by 1999. Assuming an annual average growth rate of 3%
would imply that it takes 25 years before Russia would reach a GDP level comparable to
the pre-transition level of GDP. In contrast, the collapse in employment has been much
more moderate. Figure 2 shows a collapse in employment of only 15% over a 10 year
period, while average real producer wages collapsed to 30% of their initial level in 1991
(Figure 3). The relationship between the evolution of employment, output and real wages
is not well understood. The purpose of this paper is to use micro data to analyse labour
demand in the Russian Federation and to point out factors that explain the relationship
between wages, output and employment adjustment.
Most of the studies on labour market adjustment in Russia that use micro data
have focused on responses of workers to transition or have used household data to get at
firm behaviour.
1  But little is known about the actual employment adjustment of firms in
response to output shocks and changes in wages. There are three papers that study
employment adjustment of firms in the context of gross job flows. Konings and Walsh
(1999) and Richter and Schaffer (1997) both use firm level surveys to study gross job
creation and destruction in ‘de novo’ and traditional firms and find that ‘de novo’ firms
have higher job creation rates, but also higher job destruction rates. Both papers estimate
                                                          
1 See for example Newell and Reilly (1996), Foley (1997), Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000), Earle and
Sabirianova (1998) and Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1999).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
2
for Russia a gross job reallocation rate of 9%. Acquisti and Lehmann (1999), using
census-type data for four Russian regions, estimate this rate in 1997 to be 13%, 19% and
22% for large and medium firms in manufacturing, construction and trade respectively
and to be 76% for small firms in these three sectors, falling to 34% in the case of
continuing firms.  In the case of continuing firms the overall picture clearly shows that
job destruction dominates job creation. None of these papers looks at the relationship
between employment adjustment and wages and output. Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1999)
look at labour demand in transition countries, including Russia, but the latter country is
not in the centre of their analysis.
This paper is to our knowledge the first study that uses a large firm level data set
to estimate labour demand of state-owned, privatised firms and of firms with mixed
ownership in the Russian Federation.
2 As noted by Blanchard (1997), one of the key
issues to investigate is whether firms continued to hoard labour and to what extent
downward wage adjustment occurred. One could expect that with collapsing output
workers are willing to take wage cuts to preserve their jobs. Thus, one can expect a trade-
off between wages and employment and so it will be of particular interest to investigate
wage elasticities. In addition, if state firms keep operation under soft-budget constraints
one would expect labour hoarding to continue.  Much of the empirical literature on firm
adjustment in the early years of transition shows little difference in the behaviour of state-
owned and privatised firms. Five years into transition one might wonder whether and
how Russian privatised firms differ in their employment decisions from their state-owned
counterparts. We will touch upon these issues in this paper and hope therefore to provide
insights into the nature of the trade off between wages and employment at the firm levelWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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in Russia. In this context, we will try to relate observed data to basic neoclassical theory
by using and testing three of Marshall’s rules of derived demand (cf. Hamermesh, 1993,
and Hicks, 1968) and by looking in addition at the elasticity of labour supply, which
feeds into the capability of the economy to adjust employment.  The estimation of the
elasticity of labour supply also serves as a substitute for testing Marshall’s fourth rule of
derived demand that relates labour demand to the supply elasticities of other factors of
production.
Our research uses two main data sources. We use census-type micro data of more
than 4800 state-owned, privatised and mixed firms in four representative regions of the
Russian Federation
3 to estimate labour demand equations. In addition, we will make use
of micro data from the Russian Labour Force Survey (RLFS) of November 1997 and a
supplement to this survey that contains wage data to see how elastic labour supply is in
Russia. The RLFS data at our disposal cover the same regions.
The next section discusses the data set that we use to estimate labour demand.
Section III gives some theoretical background and discusses Marshall’s rules of derived
demand. Section IV reports results for various specifications and sub-samples that we
consider. Section V tests three of Marshall’s rules and hence attempts to provide a partial
interpretation of the wage elasticities that we estimate. In this section we also estimate
wage elasticities from the supply side. The conclusions are given in section VI.
II. Data
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 Luke and Schaffer (1999) test wage determination models in Russia employing the same data set.
3 These regions are Moscow City, Chelyabinsk, Chuvashia and Krasnoyarsk. These regions are
representative of certain labour market types in the Russian Federation (cf. Lehmann, Gontmakher and
Starodubrovskiy (1999).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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The research is based on end-year 1996 and 1997 data sets for “medium-sized and
large” enterprises (MLEs) in the four above-mentioned regions. The data on MLEs are
census-type data that go back to Soviet times.  In the Soviet Union virtually all state-
owned enterprises were of medium or large size and had to report certain statistics to
Goskomstat on a quarterly or annual basis. After the beginning of the reforms
Goskomstat sent modified questionnaires to the same firms accommodating the need for
different information in a changed economic environment. Small firms, which hardly
existed in the Soviet Union but had been created in large numbers after the economic
regime switch, were not covered by any official data collection. Consequently, starting in
1994 Goskomstat has been sending a questionnaire designed for “small firms” (“malye
predpriyatiye”) to a random sample of such firms in each administrative region of the
Russian Federation.  In our assessment, data on MLEs refer, therefore, above all to
enterprises that have already existed under central planning and that have continued their
activities during transition, while data on “small firms” refer for the most part to firms
that have been born after January 1992.  Labour demand of the latter firms is not
investigated in this paper.
The characterisation of MLEs as enterprises continuing from Soviet times has an
important implication.  The MLEs come in three ownership categories; they are labelled
“state-owned”, “private” and “mixed”. The vast majority of MLEs that are labelled
“private” in our data can be considered privatised firms, while those labelled “mixed”
refer to partially privatised enterprises where private capital is domestically owned andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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the state still has a stake in the firm. So, de novo private firms are virtually absent in the
used data set.
The data cover three industries: manufacturing and mining, construction and
distribution and trade. They make up the lion share of employment in the non-budgetary
sector of the Russian economy well into the transition and most restructuring in the
Russian economy is taking place in these three industries (Gimpelson and Lippoldt,
2000). So, by choosing manufacturing and mining, construction and distribution and
trade we hope to capture some general patterns of labour demand in Russia.
 4
Our data set is very rich, containing many variables on employment, variables on
sales, labour costs and material costs as well as variables on balance sheet items. A
synoptic description of the data set is provided in the appendix. Those variables that are
particularly interesting in connection with the estimation of labour demand equations are
presented in Table 1.  Average employment is largest in mixed firms, smallest in state-
owned firms, while the average real wage is lowest in privatised firms and highest in
mixed firms.
5  Both real output and employment have been falling substantially in 1997,
but the decline in employment has been lower on average than the decline in output.
Some interesting differences across ownership types can also be observed.  The
contraction in real output is nearly twice as large in privatised compared to state-owned
firms.  The fall in employment is also lowest in state-owned firms while mixed
enterprises have roughly the same employment growth of  –11% as have privatised firms
even though their real output contraction is on average smaller by 5 percentage points.
                                                          
4 MLEs are officially defined by the Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) as those firms employing over
100 employees in manufacturing and mining, construction or transportation, and over 50 employees in the
wholesale trade or over 30 in the retail trade. Inspection of the data set shows, however, that the averageWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Real wages on the other hand seem quite stable over the year, so on this evidence there
seems to have been little downward wage flexibility in 1997. This is consistent with what
has been observed in aggregate data. From figure 3 we can indeed notice that real wages
in 1997 did not change very much.
III.   Labour Demand and Marshall’s Rules
One way to derive labour demand is based on cost minimisation.  If total costs are
assumed to be the sum of products of the profit-maximising input demands and factor
prices and if total costs are assumed to be linearly homogeneous in the latter, then the
total cost function can be written as
C = C ( w, r, m, Q).                           (1)
Where C are total costs, w the real wage, r the real user cost of capital, m the real unit
material cost and Q real output.  Using Shepard’s lemma, N
* = Cw (2), where N
* is the
cost-minimising demand for the input labour and Cw is the partial derivative of the total
cost function with respect to labour
6. Equation (2) can be written as
N
* = N
d( w, r, m, Q),                   (3)
                                                                                                                                                                            
annual employment of quite a few MLEs falls below the cited lower bounds. This is another reason why
one might want to characterise MLEs as firms existing already before transition.
5 To deflate nominal values we take 1995 as a base year.
6 This function is also consistent with models of imperfect competition in the product market. We should
also point out that we are not so myopic to assume that Russian firms are true profit maximizers or cost
minimizers. We choose the used derivation as a convenient device to generate an estimable labour demand
function that relates employment to wages and output.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Log-linearising (3) one gets an easily estimable equation that yields the constant-output
own price elasticity of demand for labour, λ NN, the cross-elasticities of labour demand,
λ NK  and λ NM, as well as the employment-output elasticity, where K stands for capital and
M for materials here. A very general specification of labour demand, which assumes that
all unit factor prices are available and which allows for some dynamics, then can take the
following estimable form of (3):
nit =  δδδδ i’ + γ ni,t-1+ β 1wit + β 2rit + β 3mit + β 4qit + ε it ,           (4)
where all variables are now in logs, ε it is a white noise error term and δδδδ  is a vector
containing unobservable regional, sector and ownership specific effects, which we
capture with regional, sector and ownership dummies. The subscripts denote firm i at
time t.  Estimating equation (4) in its full version is in most cases not feasible as
information on user cost of capital and unit material cost are not readily available at the
firm level.  In our case we try to control for r and m with regional, sector and ownership
dummies.  The equation, with which we estimate labour demand using the entire data set,
becomes therefore:
nit =  δδδδ i’ + γ ni,t-1+ β 1wit + β 2qit + ε it .        (5)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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While we estimate (5), using OLS, we also employ IV estimation to avoid potential
endogeneity problems. For real wages and real output, lagged values of real wages and
output turn out to be feasible and good instruments.
We take a close look at Marshall’s rules of derived demand in order to understand
better what might drive the real wage elasticity estimates of labour demand in Russia.
Marshall's rules are valid when the economy is in equilibrium, i.e. in the long run.  We
understand "long run" in connection with equation (5) as a steady state, which implies
that we equate nit and ni,t-1  so that the relevant long run coefficients become β 1/(1 - γ ) and
β 2/ (1 - γ ).
7 Equation (5) gives the conditional demand for labour or the constant output
demand for labour, while Marshall’s rules are related to the unconditional demand for
labour, when output is allowed to vary. To estimate an unconditional demand function for
labour, however, requires to endogenise the output decision, whish from a theoretical
point of view is done by substituting the output for the output supply function of the firm,
which requires information on prices and supply. Such data, however, are not available.
However, apart from considering the OLS results of the conditional demand function for
labour we also consider to instrument output in the labour demand function that we
estimate.
The four rules of derived demand can be synoptically summarised as follows
(Hamermesh, Chapter 2; Hicks, 1968):
                                                          
7 Since we do not control for capital and material inputs in regression (5) one could also think of β 1 and β 2
as long-run coefficients.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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1/  Ceteris paribus, the lower the labour share in total revenue, the lower the own wage
elasticity.
2/  Given the labour share in total revenue, the lower the substitution elasticity, the lower
the own price elasticity.
3/ Labour demand is less elastic when the demand for the product is less elastic.
4/ Labour demand is less elastic, the less elastic is the supply of other factors of
production.
Labour shares can easily be estimated with our data as we can readily compute
sales and the wage bill in real terms. To arrive at an estimate of the elasticity of
substitution between labour and capital and labour and material respectively, we estimate
two-input translog production functions, where we fix either materials or capital. We then
recover from the coefficient estimates the two elasticities of substitution.
The estimation of product demand is somewhat less straightforward. Our strategy is to
produce estimates of the “Lerner Index”, i.e. estimates of the price cost margin, which is
equivalent to the inverse of the product demand elasticity. Our methodology is based on
Hall (1986), Domowitz et al. (1988) and Roeger (1995). We start from a standard
production function  () it it it it it M K N F Q , , Θ = , where i is a firm index for the firm, t is a
time index, Θ is the level of productivity, N is labour, K is capital and M is material
input.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Under perfect competition, it is well known since Solow that the growth rate of output
can be decomposed as follows:
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Under imperfect competition. Eq. (6) becomes (Hall, 1986):
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where 
c
p
= µ is the markup of price over marginal cost.
Another way to write it is:
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c p
 is the Lerner index.
It is also possible to derive a similar expression for the price based, or dual,  Solow
residual (Roeger, 1995):
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Then substracting (9) from (8):William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Rewriting the left hand side as  y ∆ and the right hand side as  x ∆ , one obtains a very
simple testable equation:  it it t it x y ε β + ∆ = ∆ , where we have have imposed the same
coefficient for all firms. We shall use Eq. (10) to estimate the Lerner index or the inverse
of the product demand elasticity. This methodology allows us to use nominal values of
the variables and the Lerner index can be estimated consistently using OLS (Roeger,
1995). The methodology is similar to Levinsohn (1993) and Konings et al. (2001).
IV. Results: Labour Demand
Tables 2 – 5 report estimated labour demand equations for the total data set of
MLEs and for various sub-samples. Below the coefficients the standard errors are shown
in parentheses. In virtually all cases we give the results of both OLS and IV estimation,
where the variables of interest are highly significant throughout.  The wage elasticity for
the entire data set (Table 2) is roughly 0.06 in absolute value if we use the IV estimates
and the “long run” wage elasticity is about 0.26. This estimate is low by international
standards; wage elasticities that are estimated from micro data in the many western
studies on labour demand are seldom less than 0.45 in absolute value (Hamermesh, 1993,
chapter 3).  So, on this evidence there is little trade-off between wages and employment
in Russia.  The employment-output elasticity is also low by international standards. ThisWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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can be taken as evidence that labour hoarding might still be a problem, possible due to
the presence of soft budget constraints.  The interpretation of labour hoarding that is
associated with low output elasticities is also given in Estrin and Svejnar (1997) who
estimate labour demand functions for Central and East European Countries. They find
that at the start of transition wage and output elasticities are very low, however, once
transition progresses these elasticities also increase.
Looking at the results for the overall sample in Table 2 and thinking of a steady
state long run we get a unitary long run employment-output elasticity - the estimate of β 2/
(1 - γ ) is roughly one.  This would imply a CES production function underlying the
labour demand equation.  So we estimated a labour demand equation imposing the
restrictions that mirror a CES production technology.  The results (not shown) again give
us a very low own wage elasticity of labour demand, i.e. an elasticity of -0.07, which
given the assumption of a CES production technology is exactly the same as the
substitution elasticity between labour and capital.
The result of inelastic labour demand in Russia is not altered when we
disaggregate the data by ownership (Table 3).     Taking the IV estimates of the labour
demand equations, all ownership types have low wage and output elasticities. It is
noteworthy that privatised firms have a particularly weak wage-employment trade-off,
while the steady state employment-output elasticities are roughly equal across ownership
categories.
When we estimate labour demand separately for regions we do see some
substantial differences, though (Table 4).  Calculating steady state values, Chuvashia has
a wage elasticity that is roughly three and a half times larger in absolute value than theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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wage elasticities of Moscow and Krasnoyarsk and slightly less than double the wage
elasticity in Chelyabinsk. The employment-output elasticities, on the other hand, show
little variation across regions, with a spread of 15 percentage points between the highest
value in Chelyabinsk (0.91) and the lowest value in Chuvashia (0.76).  The estimated
wage elasticities by sector show some differences between trade and the other two
sectors.  The long run wage elasticity in trade (-0.57) is in absolute value larger by 12
percentage points than the wage elasticity in manufacturing, while the employment-wage
elasticity is virtually zero in the case of construction.  The more elastic labour demand in
the trade sector is a result that one might expect, as this sector should be more
competitive than manufacturing.
Summarising the results on estimates of wage and employment elasticities one
should stress that in general these elasticities are very low hinting at a weak link between
movements in wages and output on the one hand and movements in employment on the
other hand.  Whether neoclassical theory can shed some light on this outcome will be
discussed in the next section where we test Marshall’s rules of derived demand.
V. Results: Testing Marshall’s Rules
We first look at the calculated average labour shares for the overall data set and
the various sub-samples that we previously discussed (Table 6). Labour shares are
defined as the wage bill divided by total output. For the sample as a whole the average
share is 24%, which is relatively high by western standards.  For example, in Belgium
this share has been estimated to be about 12%. This suggests that compared to a WesternWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Economy, such as Belgium, we would expect the wage elasticity to be higher in absolute
value in Russia, given the relative high labour share. Wage elasticities using firm level
data have been estimated for Belgium. Konings and Roodhooft (1997) estimate a short
run wage elasticity of -0.60 and a long run of –1.2 for Belgian firms on average. Of
course the relatively high labour share in Russia may be an artifact of rapidly collapsing
sales, while such collapses do not occur in Western firms.  So, in addition to performing
cross-country comparisons we also look at differences in the labour shares within our
Russian sample. Table 6 shows the average labour shares and the short run and long run
wage elasticities. Across ownership types and regions Marshall’s first rule seems to be
borne out by the data albeit only in a rough manner. Firms in private ownership and in
Moscow region have substantially lower average labour shares and also lower short and
long run wage elasticities. However, we find a pattern that is clearly inconsistent with
Marshall’s first rule for the three sectors.
The estimates of the Lerner Index are given in Table 7.  The estimate of 0.45 for
the Lerner index for the overall sample implies an elasticity of product demand equal to
2.2. To set this into international perspective, using firm level data Konings, Van
Cayseele and Warzynski (2001) estimate a product demand elasticity of 4.5 for Belgium
and of 2.9 for the Netherlands, which is known to have an economy with one of the most
developed cartel structures.  So our estimate of product demand in the four Russian
regions, hinting at strongly monopolistic product market structures, implies that inelastic
product demand contributes to the low labour demand elasticity. When we compare the
pattern of the Lerner index according to sectors within regions in Russia, however, we
notice that the Lerner index in the ‘Trade’ sector is much higher than the Lerner index inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Construction’. The fact that mark-ups are higher in the non-
manufacturing sector is also found for Western countries (Small, 1997). The high Lerner
index in the ‘Trade’ sector suggests that imperfect competition cannot serve as an
explanation for differences between labour demand elasticities across sectors in Russia.
However, as suggested by Brown and Earle (2000), competitive pressure in Russia has an
important regional dimension, rather than a sectoral one. When we consider the Lerner
index for the different regions then we can note that the regions with the higher Lerner
index also are the regions with the lower labour demand elasticities
8. So, this seems to
confirm the predictions of Marshall’s rule related to the product demand elasticity.
Table 8   give the estimates of the substitution elasticities of labour and capital
and of labour and materials respectively. The elasticities are computed on the bases of
estimates of translog production functions
9. From table 8 it can be noted that they all are
estimated close to zero, although the standard deviations are quite large
10.  So, there is
very little substitution between inputs and Leontieff-type production functions seems to
mirror the production process in these Russian firms quite well.  This in line with some of
the literature on labour market adjustment in Russia (e.g. Commander et al., 1995). Of
course, these estimates also say that low substitutability between input factors contributes
to the low wage elasticity of labour demand. It is interesting to note that the substitution
elasticity for the trade sector between labour and capital is estimated higher on average
                                                          
8 We were not able to estimate the Lerner index for Krasnoyarsk since data on material costs were missing
for that region.
9 For the Krasnoyarsk region data on capital and material inputs were missing, so we do not report results
for that region. We estimated two input translog production functions.  In a previous version we used
lagged values of the input factors to avoid a potential similateneity bias, but the results were very similar.
10 The negative average substitution elasticities in most cases is mainly due by the fact that the marginal
product of capital is often estimated negative.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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than for the other sectors. This is driven by some outliers in the data as suggested by the
high standard deviation. Nevertheless it is consistent with finding a higher wage elasticity
in the ‘trade sector’.
The last contributing parameter that can be estimated is the elasticity of labour
supply.  Supply elasticities of capital and materials, which ideally should be estimated,
can in general not be obtained because of data limitations.  Our data set is no exception
and we have to satisfy ourselves with estimates of labour supply elasticities, which is
taken as a proxy for the elasticity of factors of production.  Data from the Russian Labour
Force Survey and from a complementary supplement, which includes wages and
variables that might influence the decision to participate in the labour market are used for
the estimation of labour supply equations.  We employ the usual Heckman procedure to
control for selectivity bias. The supplement to the RLFS gives us a rich enough set of
variables for the probit equation that estimates the probability of participating in the
labour market.  For example, non-wage income, education, income from sale of home-
grown produce, consumption of home-grown produce and number of events in a person’s
labour market biography since 1990 are some of the variables used in the probit
regression.
The elasticities, estimated separately for males and females, are very low by
international comparison, never exceeding 0.07 (see Table 9). In western economies the
range of elasticity estimates do normally not fall below 0.1.  So low labour supply
elasticity, if taken as a proxy for the elasticity of other factors of production, seems to be
a contributing factor to the low labour demand elasticity in Russia.  In addition, given the
very low labour supply elasticities a very low labour demand elasticity will generateWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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comparative statics that are mirrored in the stylized facts of the Russian labour market,
i.e. a fall in real wages that is proportionally larger than the fall in employment, where the
latter is, however, substantial.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have used a unique enterprise-level data set, which covers the
regions Moscow City, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk and Chuvashia and the three sectors
manufacturing and mining, construction and trade and distribution, in order to estimate
Russian labour demand equations for the year 1997.  While the results are still tentative
we can make some conclusions with confidence.
The most important conclusion that can be drawn is that labour demand is
inelastic in international perspective if we estimate a labour demand equation for all
regions and all sectors combined. So, Russian MLEs well into the transition still exhibit
peculiar behaviour as far as wage employment trade-offs are concerned.  This principal
result is not altered when we disaggregate the data by ownership. However, there are
some noteworthy differences across regions and sectors.  In the Chuvash Republic labour
demand is more elastic - with respect to wages, but not with respect to output - than in
other regions.  What reasons lie behind the fact that MLEs in Chuvashia seemingly
respond more readily to wage changes by altering employment than do MLEs in other
regions is the subject of future research.  That the sector trade has a more elastic demand
for labour comes as less of a surprise since one would consider this sector more
competitive than manufacturing or construction.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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What are the determining factors of the overall very inelastic labour demand?
Testing Marshall's rules of derived demand for the whole sample and across various
subsets of our sample we find that inelastic labour supply proxying for factor supply
elasticity and very low elasticities of substitution between labour and other inputs are
factors that unequivocally can explain a low elasticity of labour demand. Across the
regional and ownership dimensions, labour shares show roughly the pattern that
Marshall’s first rule would predict. In the case of product demand elasticities the results
are less clear cut across the various dimensions of our sample. However, if we take the
sample as a whole we do observe that relative to countries where cartels are very
prominent players in the economy, Russian product markets seem to be characterised by
low product demand elasticities.
While more work is certainly needed once more data points for our sample of
MLEs in four regions become available, one can state that testing Marshall's rules of
derived demand seems a promising avenue for establishing some of the driving forces,
which are behind the inelastic labour demand in Russia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Appendix
Synoptic description of Russian enterprise level data for MLEs
Description Example
Information on employment for different points
in time
Average listed employment for
the last quarter of the
reporting/previous year
Information on wage fund for different points
in time
total wage fund from the
beginning/previous year
wage fund for listed employees
Social benefit payments for different points in
time
Information on working hours for different
points in time
men-hours worked, number of
employees working short-time/on
unpaid leave etc.
Job creation, job destruction from the
beginning of the year (employees without part-
timers) /
Expected for the next year
Total hirings/newly created jobs
Total separations/layoffs
Vacancies
Data on firm transactions,  monthly balance sheet, receivables,
payables, working capital, stocks
and expenditure
Data on production and transaction costs for
reporting and previous year
production output, (prime) costs,
material costs, wage costs, social
contribution, production and
transaction costs
Balance sheet for the beginning and end of the
reporting year
fixed capital, assets, own funds,
consumption funds, liabilities.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 392
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Obs. Total
Sample
Mean
(St.
Deviation)
Obs. State Firms
Mean
(St.
Deviation)
Obs. Privatised
Firms
Mean
(St.
Deviation)
Obs. Mixed
Firms
Mean
(St.
Deviation)
Employment
1997
5211 306.5957
(1450.62)
1567 179.12
(653.76)
2145 201.29
(683.13)
1338 626.13
(2402.9)
Average wage
1997
5211 89.18
(89.641)
1567 93.38
(80.19)
2145 64.18
(81)
1338 132.82
(98.317)
Real Average
Wage 1997
5211 49.27
(49.52)
1567 51.59
(44.3)
2145 35.46
(44.75)
1338 73.38
(54.31)
Output 1997 4235 30201.41
(237674.5)
1277 11590.48
(52937.02)
1704 15785.63
(59739.97)
1135 75660.74
(446699.2)
Real Output
1997
4235 16685
(131311.9)
1277 6403.5
(29246.9)
1704 8721.342
(33005.51)
1135 41801.52
(246795.1)
Change in
Employment
5076 -0.103
(0.279)
1537 -0.082
(0.227)
2068 -0.116
(0.298)
1313 -0.112
(0.309)
Change in
Real Wages
5065 -0.0163
(0.277)
1532 -0.0165
(0.267)
2066 -0.032
(0.289)
1309 0.005
(0.27)
Change in
Real Output
4117 -0.141
(0.364)
1247 -0.105
(0.351)
1643 -0.182
(0.359)
1109 -0.135
(0.386)
Note: Wages in 100000 of Rbl
Output in millions of RblTable 2: Labour Demand – Total Sample. Dependent variable ln(N)
Total Sample
OLS
Total Sample
IV
Variable Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Constant -0.28
(0.22)
-0.272
(0.023)
Employment_1 0.77
(0.016)
0.77
(0.018)
Real Av. Wage -0.075
(0.008)
-0.061
(0.009)
Real Output 0.1822
(0.0107)
0.173
(0.013)
Ownership
Private
State 0.035
(0.012)
0.028
(0.012)
Mixed 0.0065
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.011)
Sector
Trade
Metall 0.089
(0.0319)
0.08
(0.032)
Chem 0.142
(0.0311)
0.121
(0.029)
Machine 0.153
(0.0255)
0.135
(0.026)
Wood 0.132
(0.025)
0.117
(0.026)
Constr.-man. 0.053
(0.02)
0.044
(0.021)
Light 0.192
(0.028)
0.175
(0.029)
Food 0.0316
(0.019)
0.025
(0.019)
Medmbiol 0.078
(0.023)
0.063
(0.022)
F-power -0.029
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.031)
Construction 0.091
(0.021)
0.079
(0.023)
Region
Moskva
Krasnoyarsk 0.096
(0.0124)
0.077
(0.013)
Chelyabinsk 0.138
(0.012)
0.125
(0.013)
Chuvashiya 0.098
(0.016)
0.083
(0.017)
F-statistics=8348.60
R-squared=0.9687
F-statistics=8095.33
R-squared=0.9686Table 3: Labour Demand by Ownership Type.
              Dependent variable ln(N).
State OLS State IV Mixed
OLS
Mixed IV Private OLS Private IV
Variable Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Constant -0.27
(0.044)
-0.299
(0.055)
-0.256
(0.057)
-0.27
(0.051)
-0.305
(0.036)
-0.31
(0.04)
Employment_1 0.726
(0.035)
0.719
(0.039)
0.794
(0.023)
0.81
(0.025)
0.774
(0.027)
0.79
(0.032)
Real Av. Wage -0.094
(0.017)
-0.08
(0.021)
-0.104
(0.025)
-0.07
(0.028)
-0.059
(0.011)
-0.04
(0.012)
Real Output 0.218
(0.023)
0.219
(0.028)
0.173
(0.019)
0.152
(0.021)
0.178
(0.017)
0.166
(0.022)
Sector
Trade
Metall 0.11
(0.055)
0.106
(0.057)
0.152
(0.066)
0.127
(0.068)
0.042
(0.043)
0.024
(0.044)
Chem 0.328
(0.084)
0.33
(0.09)
0.179
(0.069)
0.138
(0.069)
0.09
(0.045)
0.07
(0.042)
Machine 0.2
(0.048)
0.193
(0.05)
0.215
(0.069)
0.181
(0.071)
0.092
(0.035)
0.071
(0.035)
Wood 0.175
(0.044)
0.175
(0.046)
0.21
(0.071)
0.177
(0.073)
0.046
(0.039)
0.015
(0.04)
Constr.-man. 0.027
(0.049)
0.02
(0.05)
0.15
(0.065)
0.125
(0.067)
-0.003
(0.027)
-0.015
(0.027)
Light 0.256
(0.049)
0.251
(0.05)
0.225
(0.07)
0.19
(0.073)
0.127
(0.048)
0.104
(0.051)
Food 0.058
(0.031)
0.05
(0.031)
0.108
(0.06)
0.087
(0.062)
-0.013
(0.03)
-0.017
(0.031)
Medmbiol 0.124
(0.034)
0.11
(0.0355)
0.131
(0.064)
0.1
(0.06)
-0.035
(0.062)
-0.051
(0.061)
F-power -0.085
(0.055)
-0.103
(0.064)
0.037
(0.052)
0.037
(0.053)
0.059
(0.055)
0.088
(0.061)
Construction 0.141
(0.045)
0.142
(0.047)
0.162
(0.068)
0.12
(0.072)
0.051
(0.029)
0.032
(0.03)
Region
Moskva
Krasnoyarsk 0.115
(0.023)
0.096
(0.027)
0.074
(0.021)
0.056
(0.022)
0.11
(0.025)
0.086
(0.029)
Chelyabinsk 0.193
(0.031)
0.187
(0.036)
0.086
(0.016)
0.09
(0.016)
0.146
(0.022)
0.125
(0.025)
Chuvashiya 0.126
(0.023)
0.116
(0.027)
0.059
(0.033)
0.059
(0.034)
0.165
(0.042)
0.142
(0.044)
F-statistics=
2176.03
R-squared=
0.9611
F-statistics=
2168.23
R-squared=
0.9616
F-statistics=
1841.60
R-squared=
0.9675
F-statistics=
1817.94
R-squared=
0.9664
F-statistics=
4103.52
R-squared=
0.9581
F-statistics=
37.64
R-squared=
0.9592Table 4: Labour Demand by Region.
              Dependent variable ln(N).
Krasnoyarsk OLS Krasnoyarsk IV Moskva OLS Moskva IV
Variable Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Constant 0.079
(0.11)
-0.199
(0.124)
-0.33
(0.028)
-0.317
(0.03)
Employment_1 0.8
(0.03)
0.868
(0.034)
0.824
(0.021)
0.843
(0.026)
Real Av. Wage -0.151
(0.038)
-0.043
(0.042)
-0.057
(0.014)
-0.032
(0.019)
Real Output 0.179
(0.026)
0.115
(0.029)
0.152
(0.014)
0.132
(0.019)
Ownership
Private
State 0.079
(0.023)
0.065
(0.024)
0.03
(0.016)
0.029
(0.017)
Mixed 0.031
(0.025)
0.02
(0.025)
-0.0009
(0.015)
-0.0009
(0.015)
Sector
Trade
Metall -0.054
(0.098)
-0.056
(0.105)
0.049
(0.052)
0.008
(0.056)
Chem 0.005
(0.046)
0.026
(0.043)
0.087
(0.042)
0.042
(0.048)
Machine -0.018
(0.033)
-0.008
(0.035)
0.095
(0.045)
0.041
(0.051)
Wood -0.005
(0.032)
0.006
(0.035)
0.031
(0.045)
-0.013
(0.051)
Constr.-man. -0.062
(0.034)
-0.035
(0.035)
-0.013
(0.044)
-0.061
(0.051)
Light -0.012
(0.034)
0.025
(0.038)
0.102
(0.048)
0.047
(0.057)
Food -0.069
(0.036)
-0.028
(0.038)
0.03
(0.0345)
-0.004
(0.039)
Medmbiol -0.094
(0.031)
-0.082
(0.033)
0.09
(0.044)
0.037
(0.052)
F-power -0.057
(0.067)
-0.034
(0.067)
-0.047
(0.045)
-0.08
(0.05)
Construction 0.028
(0.089)
0.021
(0.092)
0.067
(0.043)
0.017
(0.053)
F-statistics=2561
R-squared=0.9861
F-statistics=35173
R-squared=0.09851
F-statistics=6122.3
R-squared=0.97
F-statistics=6179
R-squared=0.9712Table 4 (Cont.)
Chelyabinsk OLS Chelyabinsk IV Chuvashiya OLS Chuvashiya IV
Variable Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
constant -0.024
(0.089)
-0.155
(0.11)
1.04
(0.149)
0.972
(0.160)
Employment_1 0.783
(0.024)
0.822
(0.031)
0.366
(0.043)
0.401
(0.046)
Real Av. Wage -0.141
(0.032)
-0.077
(0.038)
-0.483
(0.058)
-0.432
(0.063)
Real Output 0.205
(0.022)
0.164
(0.028)
0.505
(0.038)
0.462
(0.041)
Ownership
Private
State 0.067
(0.019)
0.066
(0.02)
-0.084
(0.043)
-0.091
(0.044)
Mixed 0.006
(0.016)
0.004
(0.016)
-0.021
(0.044)
-0.023
(0.046)
Sector
Trade
Metall -0.121
(0.044)
-0.091
(0.044)
-0.11
(0.05)
-0.084
(0.041)
Chem -0.136
(0.047)
-0.11
(0.051)
0.029
(0.115)
0.089
(0.12)
Machine -0.053
(0.027)
-0.038
(0.028)
0.117
(0.051)
0.166
(0.053)
Wood -0.046
(0.033)
-0.033
(0.033)
0.05
(0.064)
0.094
(0.067)
Constr.-man. -0.102
(0.028)
-0.078
(0.031)
-0.01
(0.06)
0.041
(0.06)
Light 0.032
(0.031)
0.046
(0.03)
0.178
(0.053)
0.207
(0.055)
Food -0.146
(0.035)
-0.121
(0.041)
-0.275
(0.062)
-0.207
(0.064)
Medmbiol -0.107
(0.045)
-0.07
(0.048)
-0.122
(0.05)
-0.095
(0.047)
F-power -0.171
(0.082)
-0.123
(0.073)
-0.421
(0.118)
-0.336
(0.113)
Construction -0.065
(0.024)
-0.059
(0.027)
-0.083
(0.063)
-0.038
(0.061)
F-statistics=3243.44
R-squared=0.9864
F-statistics=61036
R-squared=0.9856
F-statistics=784.14
R-squared=0.9856
F-statistics=9006.79
R-squared=0.9572Table 5: Labour Demand by Sector.
               Dependent variable ln(N).
Construction
OLS
Construction IV Manufacturing
OLS
Manufacturing
IV
Trade OLS Trade IV
Variable Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
Coefficient
(St.Error)
constant -0.254
(0.107)
-0.409
(0.109)
-0.076
(0.054)
-0.115
(0.057)
-0.301
(0.047)
-0.525
(0.069)
Employment_1 0.816
(0.028)
0.903
(0.024)
0.843
(0.017)
0.85
(0.019)
0.63
(0.032)
0.534
(0.043)
Real Av. Wage -0.103
(0.036)
0.012
(0.033)
-0.085
(0.017)
-0.068
(0.021)
-0.175
(0.024)
-0.268
(0.038)
Real Output 0.181
(0.027)
0.085
(0.023)
0.131
(0.011)
0.1228
(0.014)
0.287
(0.024)
0.405
(0.04)
Ownership
Private
State 0.019
(0.027)
0.016
(0.027)
0.04
(0.016)
0.038
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.021)
0.003
(0.021)
Mixed -0.01
(0.022)
-0.016
(0.023)
0.011
(0.012)
0.01
(0.011)
-0.063
(0.049)
-0.07
(0.047)
Region
Moskva
Krasnoyarsk 0.072
(0.072)
0.076
(0.079)
0.048
(0.012)
0.046
(0.012)
0.458
(0.064)
0.703
(0.101)
Chelyabinsk 0.048
(0.024)
0.067
(0.025)
0.066
(0.012)
0.067
(0.012)
0.501
(0.062)
0.773
(0.102)
Chuvashiya 0.026
(0.055)
0.069
(0.052)
0.1
(0.019)
0.107
(0.019)
0.371
(0.056)
0.659
(0.095)
F-statistics=
2098.29
R-squared=
0.9603
F-statistics=
2117.6
R-squared=
0.9614
F-statistics=
9486.17
R-squared=0.9818
F-statistics=
9273.76
R-squared=
0.9816
Fstatistics=
1667.79
R-squared=
0.905
F-statistics
=1447.16
R-squared=
0.896Table 6: Average Wage Share in Turnover, Overall, by Sector, by Region and by
Ownership Type
Share SR Elasticity LR elasticity
Total Sample: 0.22 -0.061 -0.265
State Ownership 0.28 -0.08 -0.285
Mixed Ownership 0.25 -0.07 -0.368
Private Ownership 0.16 -0.04 -0.190
Krasnoyarsk 0.31 -0.043 -0.326
Moscow 0.16 -0.032 -0.204
Chelyabinsk 0.30 -0.077 -0.433
Chuvashiya 0.32 -0.432 -0.721
Construction 0.32 0 0
Manufacturing 0.24 -0.068 -0.453
Trade 0.16 -0.268 -0.575Table 7: estimates of the Lerner index
Dep. Var.:  y ∆ Roeger method (1995), OLS
Coef. s.e.
x ∆ 0.45
*** 0.03
By sector
Manufacturing 0.28
*** 0.05
Trade 0.68
*** 0.05
Construction 0.23
*** 0.03
By region
Moscow 0.50
*** 0.05
Chelyabinsk 0.38
*** 0.04
Chuvasha 0.30
*** 0.05
By ownership
State 0.51
*** 0.06
Mixed 0.25
*** 0.07
Private 0.53
*** 0.06
Note: *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance respectively at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %Table 8: average elasticity of substitution between labour and capital  NK σ  and
between labour and material NM σ
NK σ NM σ
Average st.dev. average st.dev.
By sector
Manufacturing -0.002 0.014 -0.001 0.02
Trade 0.015 0.79 -0.002 0.01
Construction -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.006
By region
Moscow -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.006
Chelyabinsk -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.02
Chuvasha -0.003 0.03 -0.02 0.23
Note: Estimates for Krasnoyarsk were not possible because of missing data on material and capital
inputs.Table 9: Tobit Estimation of Labour Supply Wage Elasticities
Labour Supply Wage Elasticity
Males
Labour Supply Wage Elasticity
Females
Total sample
0.0260
+
(8.981)
0.0261
++
(9.002)
λ =-0.01726
(0.00017)
0.0390
+
(10.314)
0.0390
++
(10.342)
λ =-0.00602
(0.01357)
Moskva
0.0358
+
(9.196)
0.0358
++
(9.208)
λ =-0.01727
(0.0022)
0.0478
+
(10.432)
0.0467
++
(10.353)
λ =-0.04900
(0.00068)
Krasnoyarsk
0.0267
+
(3.711)
0.0257
++
(3.561)
λ =-0.07576
(0.00177)
0.0161
+
(1.991)
0.0160
++
(1.991)
λ =0.01530
(0.02682)
Chelyabinsk
0.0155
+
(2.307)
0.0142
++
(2.150)
λ =0.01868
(0.01126)
0.0689
+
(6.367)
0.0573
++
(5.9876)
λ =-0.07056
(0.00167)
Chuvashiya
0.0179
+
(1.821)
0.0182
++
(1.798)
λ =-0.12768
(0.00605)
0.0414
+
(2.530)
0.0386
++
(2.387)
λ =-0.04695
(0.00193)
Note:
+ indicates estimates from Heckman two-step estimator and 
++ stands for Tobit MLE with z-
test statistics in parentheses.
λ  gives the product of the standard error of the residual in the regression equation and the
correlation between the regression equation and the participation equation with standard errors in
parentheses.
Source: Russian Labour Force Survey + Supplement (November 1997).Figure 1
Source: Russian Economic Trends (2000)
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